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Abstract
This paper proposes an aggregative model of Total Factor Produc-
tivity (TFP) in the spirit of Houthakker (1955-1956). It considers a
frictional labor market where production units are subject to idiosyn-
cratic shocks and jobs are created and destroyed as in Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994). An aggregate production function is derived by ag-
gregating across production units in equilibrium. The level of TFP is
explicitly shown to depend on the underlying distribution of shocks as
well as on all the characteristics of the labor market as summarized
by the job-destruction decision. The model is also used to study the
eﬀects of labor-market policies on the level of measured TFP.
1 Introduction
Hall and Jones (1999), Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997), and Parente and
Prescott (2000) have established that diﬀerences in Total Factor Productiv-
ity (TFP) account for a large fraction of the variation in output per worker
across countries. Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(1997) use data on output, labor input, average educational attainment and
physical capital to decompose the diﬀerences in output per worker into dif-
ferences in capital intensity, human capital per worker and TFP. Their levels
accounting exercises reveal that diﬀerences in physical capital and educa-
tional attainment explain only a small amount of the diﬀerences in output
per worker.1 Parente and Prescott (2000) show that the standard growth
model without TFP diﬀerences is not consistent with the observed income
diﬀerences even when augmented to include a human capital sector. 2 So the
message is that in order to understand income diﬀerences across countries,
1As a way of illustration, consider the following fact reported by Hall and Jones (1999).
In 1988, output per worker in the five richest countries was on average 31.7 times that of
the five poorest. Diﬀerences in capital intensities and educational attainments contributed
factors of 1.8 and 2.2, respectively, to this diﬀerence. The remaining diﬀerence, a factor of
8.3 was accounted for by the TFP diﬀerential. Without this productivity diﬀerence, the
average output per worker of the five richest countries would have only been about four
times that of the five poorest. Hall and Jones (1999) and Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare
(1997) also report somewhat striking productivity diﬀerences among OECD countries,
with France and Italy having a higher and Germany a much lower level of TFP relative
to the US.
2Specifically, they find that reasonable diﬀerences in saving rates cannot account for
observed diﬀerences in steady-state income levels; and that the small diminishing returns
to individuals investing in human capital that are needed to fit the empirical income
diﬀerences imply that the time allocated to schooling is implausibly high. They also show
that the factor diﬀerence in TFP needed to account for the income diﬀerences between
the world’s richest and poorest countries is between 2 and 3, not unreasonably high.
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one first needs to understand what determines the level of TFP.
Hall and Jones (1999) conjecture that diﬀerences in observed TFP are
driven by diﬀerences in the institutions and government policies they collec-
tively refer to as “social infrastructure”. Corrupt government oﬃcials, severe
impediments to trade, poor contract enforcement and government interfer-
ence in production are some of their examples of bad “social infrastructures”
that could lead to low levels of TFP.3
Parente and Prescott (1994) propose that some countries have lower TFP
than others because their process of technology adoption at the micro level is
constrained by “barriers to riches”. These barriers are essentially any insti-
tution or government policy that increases the cost of technology adoption.
Parente and Prescott (1999) show that monopoly rights can act as a “barrier
to riches”.
This paper focuses on the theory underlying the aggregate production
function to show how labor-market policies aﬀect this function in general,
and the level of measured TFP in particular. Specifically, I construct an
aggregative model of TFP in the spirit of Houthakker (1955-1956): the basic
idea is to derive an aggregate production function by aggregating across
active production units. In equilibrium, the levels of output, inputs and
3Examples aside, the institutions and policies that Hall and Jones (1999) refer to as
“social infrastructure” are defined by the two variables they use to proxy it in their regres-
sions. The first is a measure of openness to trade; and the second, an index of government
“anti-diversion” policies measuring (i) law and order, (ii) bureaucratic quality, (iii) cor-
ruption, (iv) risk of expropriation, and (v) government repudiation of contracts. In their
empirical investigation, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) also highlight the role
of institutions in determining diﬀerent income levels across countries. Their focus is on
the role property rights and checks against government power, and their definition of
“institutions” is a risk-of-expropriation index.
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TFP as well as the shape of the aggregate relationship between them depend
on individual production decisions —such as which production units remain
active in the face of idiosyncratic shocks— and these decisions are in turn
aﬀected by policies. So the model can be used to study the precise interaction
between all these variables explicitly.
In the model proposed here, policy aﬀects TFP because the latter is re-
lated to the average productivity of the units which are active, and policy
induces changes in the productivity composition of active units. By dis-
torting the way in which individual production units react to the economic
environment, labor-market policies can make an economy exhibit a low level
of TFP. As a result, two economies may exhibit diﬀerent levels of TFP even if
production units in both have access to the same technology and are subject
to identical shocks. In this sense the determinants of TFP levels analyzed
here are diﬀerent from the barriers to technology adoption of Parente and
Prescott (1999, 2000).4
At a theoretical level the paper also shows that, under some conditions,
4Although they focus on monopoly rights in their formal modelling, Parente and
Prescott (2000) mention several labor-market policies as examples of “barriers to riches”:
“In India, for example, firms with more than 100 workers must obtain the government’s
permission to terminate any worker, and firms of all sizes are subject to state certification
of changes in the tasks associated with a job.” (pp. 107-108). “Another way the state
protects the monopoly rights is by requiring large severance payments to laid-oﬀ workers.”
“Also in India, regulations require certain firms to award workers with lifetime employ-
ment and require firms with more that twenty-five workers to use oﬃcial labor exchanges
to fill any vacancy.” (p. 108). “In Bangladesh, for example, private buyers of the state-
owned jute mills were prohibited for one year from laying oﬀ any of the workforce they
inherited. After one year, a worker could be laid oﬀ but not without a large severance
payment.” Parente and Prescott (2000) use these as instances of policies that can lower
TFP by making technology adoption costly. But as shown here, these policies can also
have a direct impact on level of TFP through composition eﬀects.
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a standard search model of the labor market —with its underlying meeting
frictions and simple fixed-proportions micro-level production technologies—
can generate an aggregate production function just like the one implied by
the textbook neoclassical model of growth in which firms have access to a
standard constant-returns Cobb-Douglas production technology. So in this
sense, from the perspective of aggregate output, inputs and productivity, the
neoclassical and the search paradigms can seem quite close.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model.
The equilibrium is characterized in Section 3, and the classical aggregation
result of Houthakker (1955-1956) is extended to the dynamic equilibrium
search setup in Section 4. This section also shows how, when aggregate
inputs are correctly measured, the level of TFP depends on all the char-
acteristics of the labor market summarized by the job-destruction decision.
Section 5 introduces four policies: employment and hiring subsidies, firing
taxes and unemployment benefits, and studies their eﬀects on TFP. Section
6 extends the basic model to the case of serially-correlated shocks, general-
izes the main aggregation result, and elaborates on how the observed level of
TFP is aﬀected by the diﬀerent ways of measuring aggregate inputs that can
be found in the literature. Section 7 concludes. All propositions are proved
in the Appendix.
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2 The Model
The labor market is modeled as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).5 Time
is continuous and the horizon infinite. There is a continuum of infinitely
lived agents of two types: workers and firms. The size of the labor force is
normalized to unity while the number of firms is determined endogenously
by free entry. Both types are risk-neutral. Workers derive utility only from
consumption. Each firm has a single job that can either be filled or vacant and
searching. Similarly, workers can either be employed by a firm or unemployed
and searching. No new oﬀers arrive while an agent is in a relationship (i.e.
there is no on-the-job search). I abstract from capital accumulation and
assume labor-market participants take the aggregate stock of capital, K, as
given.6
Assume meeting frictions can be represented by a function m (u, v) that
determines the instantaneous number of meetings as a function of the num-
bers of searchers on each side of the market; namely unemployed workers
5There are at least three reasons for carrying out the analysis in a search and matching
framework. First, as will be discussed in Section 5, the labor-market policies considered will
have testable implications not only for the level of TFP but also for the unemployment rate
and the job-creation and destruction rates. Second, an explicit treatment of unemployment
is relevant because —as will be shown in Section 6— the unemployment rate will aﬀect
empirical measures of TFP for the ways of measuring aggregate inputs that can be found
in the literature. And finally, this framework has been used extensively to analyze the
eﬀects of similar policies on many other aggregate labor-market outcomes (see Ljungqvist
and Sargent [2000], Pissarides [2000] and references therein).
6The model abstracts from saving and accumulation because the focus here is on iso-
lating the eﬀects of labor-market policies on the level of TFP. But even in the context
of trying to explain income diﬀerences, Prescott (1998), and Parente and Prescott (2000)
conclude that one cannot rely on policies that cause diﬀerences in saving rates, as they do
not vary systematically with countries’ incomes.
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u and vacancies v. Suppose m exhibits constant returns to scale and is in-
creasing in both arguments. Let q (θ) denote the (Poisson) rate with which
a vacancy contacts an unemployed worker, where θ = v/u.7
Each firm has access to a technology f (x, n, k) that combines the hours
supplied by the worker it employs, n, and capital, k, to produce a homoge-
neous consumption good. The match-specific level of technology is indexed
by x. I assume that
f (x, n, k) = xmin (n, k) (1)
and interpret k as the firm’s “capacity”. So output is linear in hours but
is bounded above by the stock of capital the firm is operating with. The
convention is that firm i has to choose and put in place ki —its “scale of
operation”— in order to engage in search and that this choice is irreversible.8
This captures the idea that hours are a fully flexible factor while capital is
relatively fixed. Firms rent capital from a competitive market at flow cost c.
Match productivity is stochastic and indexed by the random variable x.
For an active match, the process that changes the productivity is Poisson
with finite arrival rate λ. When a match of productivity x suﬀers a change,
the new value x0 is a draw from the fixed distribution G (z). So the pro-
7Note that q (θ) = m (1/θ, 1) and hence q0 < 0. The probability a worker contacts a
vacancy in a small time interval is θq (θ) and is increasing in θ. See Lagos (2000) for an
environment in which a constant-returns aggregate matching function is explicitly derived
from first principles.
8The idea is that in order to search, the firm must have borrowed some capital (e.g.
to set up a plant). The firm is initially free to pick any size of plant ki, but this choice is
irreversible in the sense that once put in place, ki cannot be changed. In a similar vein,
technologies are assumed fixed and irreversible in Gilchrist and Williams (2000) and in
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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ductivity process is persistent (since λ < ∞) but —conditional on change—
it is independent of the firm’s previous state.9 The Poisson process and the
productivity draws are iid across firms and there is no aggregate uncertainty.
The focus will be on steady state outcomes.
In the next section I will show that there is a productivity level R such
that active matches dissolve if productivity ever falls below R and new
matches form only if their initial productivity is at least R.10 Let Ht (x) de-
note the cross-sectional distribution of productivities among active matches.
That is, Ht (x) is the fraction of matches producing at productivities x or
lower at time t. The time path of (1− ut)Ht (x), namely of the number of
matches producing at productivities x or lower at time t is given by11
d
dt
[(1− ut)Ht (x)] = λ (1− ut) [1−Ht (x)] [G (x)−G (Rt)]
+θq (θ)ut [G (x)−G (Rt)]
−λ (1− ut)Ht (x)G (Rt)
−δ (1− ut)Ht (x)
−λ (1− ut)Ht (x) [1−G (x)] .
9This is the process used by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). For reasons that will be
clear below, Section 6 generalizes the model by specifying that when a match of produc-
tivity x suﬀers a change, the new value x0 is a draw from the fixed distribution G (z|x).
If G (z|x1) < G (z|x0) when x0 < x1, then apart from persistent, idiosyncratic shocks are
also positively correlated through time.
10Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) work with a bounded support and assume new
matches start oﬀ with the highest productivity. I relax these assumptions and treat active
and new matches symmetrically. In the model considered here, the initial productivity
of a match is a non-degenerate random variable drawn from the same distribution as the
innovations to active matches.
11The fact that active matches will form and continue only for productivities at least as
large as Rt means that Ht (Rt) = 0. So the derivation below focuses on x ≥ Rt.
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The first term accounts for the matches with productivities above x that get
innovations below x but above Rt. The newly-formed matches that start oﬀ
with productivities no larger than x are in the second term. The third term
is the number of matches in the interval [Rt, x] that get shocks below Rt
and are destroyed. Let δ denote the parameter of an independent Poisson
process that causes separations for unmodelled reasons. Then the fourth term
accounts for matches in the interval [Rt, x] that are destroyed for exogenous
reasons. The last term accounts for the number of matches in the same
interval that “move up” by virtue of having drawn productivities larger than
x. Imposing steady states:
H (x) =
·
λ
δ + λ
+
θq (θ)u
(δ + λ) (1− u)
¸
[G (x)−G (R)] .
In addition, the steady-state unemployment rate is
u =
δ + λG (R)
δ + λG (R) + θq (θ) [1−G (R)] . (2)
Using this expression, the steady-state cross-sectional productivity distribu-
tion can be rewritten as
H (x) =
G (x)−G (R)
1−G (R) . (3)
Firms can be either vacant and searching or filled. The problem of a
searching firm is summarized by
rV = max
k
·
−ck + q (θ)
Z
max [J (z)− V, 0] dG (z)
¸
, (4)
where V is the asset value of a vacancy, J (x) the asset value of a filled job
and r the discount factor. There is entry of firms until all rents are exhausted,
9
so rV = 0 in equilibrium. Letting π (x) denote flow profit,
rJ (x) = π (x) + λ
Z
max [J (z) , V ] dG (z)− λJ (x)− δ [J (x)− V ] , (5)
where π (x) = maxn [xmin (n, k)− φn− ck − C (x,φ) k − w (x)]. Instanta-
neous profit is the residual output after the wage w (x) and all other costs
of production have been paid out. There are three such costs in this formu-
lation: a fixed one, ck, which is the rental on capital; a variable cost, φn,
that can be managed by varying hours; and a “maintenance cost” C (x,φ)
per unit of capital. Given the wage-determination rule adopted below (Nash
bargaining), the assumption that workers derive no utility from leisure im-
plies that w is independent of n, so the profit-maximizing choice of hours
is
n (x) =
½
k if φ < x
0 if x ≤ φ (6)
and hence flow profit is π (x) = [max (x− φ, 0)− c− C (x,φ)] k − w (x).
One can think of φ as the cost of electricity, for instance, with electricity
usage being proportional to hours worked. This variable cost is introduced to
allow for the possibility of “labor hoarding” and underutilization of capital,
two pervasive features of the data. Specifically, for some parametrizations,
it will be possible that at low productivity realizations the firm chooses to
keep the worker employed despite requiring that she supplies zero hours.
Below I show that this extreme variety of labor hoarding has interesting
aggregate implications when it occurs in equilibrium. The maintenance cost
is introduced in this section as a simple device to avoid a “flat spot” in flow
profit which would otherwise carry over to the value functions. Since it is
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perhaps the only non-standard element of the model, I redo the whole analysis
without this device in Section 6. So for now, I use a convenient specification
for the maintenance cost, namely C (x,φ) = max (φ− x, 0).12 With this
specification, instantaneous profit becomes π (x) = (x− φ− c) k − w (x) for
any x.
The value of employment and unemployment to a worker are denoted
W (x) and U respectively and solve
rU = b+ θq (θ)
Z
max [W (z)− U, 0] dG (z) (7)
rW (x) = w (x) + λ
Z
max [W (z)− U, 0] dG (z) (8)
− (δ + λ) [W (x)− U ] ,
where b ≥ 0 is a worker’s flow income while unemployed.
3 Equilibrium
I follow the bulk of the labor search literature by letting β ∈ [0, 1) and
assuming the instantaneous wage w (x) solves
(1− β) [W (x)− U ] = βJ (x) (9)
12One way to interpret this formulation is that machines require no maintainance if
they are being operated by workers; so if x ≥ φ, the maintainance cost is zero and flow
profit is just (x− φ− c) k − w (x). But when they stand idle, machines need to be run,
even without a worker, in order to keep them operational. The time they need to be run
depends on productivity. If x = 0, say, then the machine needs to be run at the cost of a
full shift, φ, but if x > 0, then each machine needs to be run for less time, at cost φ − x
per machine. So for x < φ, output is zero, and flow profit is − [(φ− x+ c) k + w (x)];
the firm loses the maintainance cost, the cost of capital, and the wage payment to labor.
Alternatively, one could interpret φ to be the depreciation rate of capital. In this case,
C (x,φ) would be the (stochastic) depreciation rate suﬀered by the machine when it is not
being used.
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at all times. Letting S (x) = J (x) +W (x) − U denote the surplus from a
match, notice that (9) implies J (x) = (1− β)S (x) andW (x)−U = βS (x).
These together with (5), (7) and (8) imply
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = (x− φ− c) k − rU + λ
Z
max [S (z) , 0] dG (z) ,
where
rU = b+
β
1− βkcθ. (10)
Since S0 (x) = k
r+δ+λ
> 0, there exists a unique R such that S (R) > 0
iﬀ x > R. Hence matches separate whenever productivity falls below R.13
Using this reservation strategy the surplus can be written as
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = (x− φ− c) k − rU + λ
Z
R
S (z) dG (z) . (11)
For completeness, (9) and the value functions can be manipulated to obtain
expressions for instantaneous wages and profit:
w (x) = β (x− φ− c) k + (1− β) rU (12)
π (x) = (1− β) [(x− φ− c) k − rU ] . (13)
Intuitively, the wage is a weighted average of output (net of the rental on
capital and the variable and maintenance costs) and the worker’s reservation
wage.
I now do some analysis to characterize the job-creation and destruction
decisions as summarized by θ and R respectively. Evaluating (11) at x = R,
λ
Z
R
S (z) dG (z) = rU − (R− φ− c) k.
13Notice that separations are privately eﬃcient. Moreover, they are also consensual in
the sense that by (9), J (x) > 0 iﬀ W (x)−U > 0; so the firm wants to destroy the match
iﬀ the worker wants to quit.
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Notice that since the expected capital gain on the left-hand-side is positive,
at x = R net output is smaller than the worker’s reservation wage. Thus
(12) and (13) imply that w (R) < rU and π (R) < 0: workers and firms
sometimes tolerate instantaneous payoﬀs below those they could get by sep-
arating, in anticipation of a future productivity improvement.14 Substituting
this simpler expression for the expected capital gain term into (11) gives
S (x) =
x−R
r + δ + λ
k. (14)
Evaluating (11) at x = R and using (14) to substitute S (·) yields the job-
destruction condition:
R− φ− c−
µ
b
k
+
β
1− β cθ
¶
+
λ
r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) = 0. (15)
As is standard, the destruction decision is independent of scale if b is. The
natural interpretation of b is that it is unemployment insurance income.
Along these lines, if one lets b = τ bEG [w (x) |x ≥ R], where τ b ∈ [0, 1) is
the replacement rate, then b = bˆk, with
bˆ =
τ bβ [x˜ (R)− φ− c+ cθ]
1− (1− β) τ b
and x˜ (R) ≡ EG [x|x ≥ R] = [1−G (R)]−1
R
R
xdG (x). Under this specifica-
tion, b is linear in k and hence (15) is independent of k. In this case (15)
becomes:
R− τbβx˜(R)
1−(1−β)τb −
(1−τb)(φ+c)
1−(1−β)τb −
βcθ
(1−β)[1−(1−β)τb] +
λ
r+δ+λ
Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) = 0.
14This feature of the model is a consequence of the costly and time-consuming meeting
process, as noted by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
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In what follows I will always abstract from scale eﬀects caused by unemploy-
ment income b by assuming it is a fraction of the average going wage. At
times I may even resort to the especially tractable case with τ b = b = 0.
Substituting rV = 0 in (4) implies that at the optimal k,
(1− β)
Z
R
S (x) dG (x) =
ck
q (θ)
.
That is, the expected profit from a filled job equals the expected hiring cost
in an equilibrium with free entry. Using (14) to substitute S (·) out of this
expression yields the job-creation condition:Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) = (r + δ + λ) c
(1− β) q (θ) . (16)
The job-creation and destruction conditions jointly determine R and θ,
and under the maintained assumptions they are independent of the choice of
scale, k.15 For given c and φ, an equilibrium is a vector [θ, R,H,U,w, u, k]
such that (θ, R) jointly solve (15) and (16); and given (θ, R), H satisfies (3);
U is given by (10); w by (12); and u by (2). In addition, the market for
capital should clear, so k must satisfy [1− (1− θ)u] k = K, where K is the
aggregate supply of capital, which labor-market participants take as given.16
15For the case with τ b = 0, for instance, it is easy to show that there is a unique pair
(θ, R) that satisfies (15) and (16). To see this notice that the slopes (in θ-R space) of the
job-creation and destruction conditions are
− (r + δ + λ) cη (θ)
(1− β) θq (θ) [1−G (R)] < 0 and
βc
(1− β)
n
1− λ[1−G(R)]r+δ+λ
o > 0
respectively, with η (θ) ≡ −θq0 (θ) /q (θ).
16Notice that using (14), (4) can be written as
rV = max
k
·
−c+ (1− β) q (θ)
r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x−R) dG (x)
¸
k.
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Note that if R < φ, then the capital and workers in matches with realizations
in [R,φ) remain employed but are not engaged in production. The firms in
these states have excess capacity and hoard labor. The following section
provides a sharper characterization of aggregate outcomes for a particular
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks.
4 Aggregation
Let Ke denote the demand for capital from all firms with filled jobs. Since
firms irreversibly choose the same amount of capital k upon entering the
market,
Ke =
1− u
1− (1− θ)uK. (17)
In general, aggregate output Y and the total number of hours worked, N , are
given by Y = (1− u) R
µ
f [x, n (x) , k] dH (x) and N = (1− u) R
µ
n (x) dH (x)
respectively, with µ ≡ max (R,φ). Using (1) and (6), these expressions
become
N = [1−H (µ)]Ke (18)
Y (Ke, µ) = [1−H (µ)]KeEH (x|x ≥ µ) , (19)
Since in equilibrium θ and R are independent of k, the objective is linear and the problem
has a solution iﬀ Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) ≤ (r + δ + λ) c
(1− β) q (θ) .
But if the inequality is strict, then each firm i will choose ki = 0 and the market is inactive.
So a nontrivial equilibrium requires (16) to hold. Then any feasible ki solves firm i’s
capacity problem: as for the standard neoclassical firm, individual size is indeterminate
in equilibrium.
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where EH (x|x ≥ µ) = [1−H (µ)]−1
R
µ
xdH (x). Intuitively, since every firm-
worker pair is setting hours either to zero or to full capacity k, the aggregate
number of hours worked is just equal to the fraction of firm-worker pairs who
engage in production times the total capital stock in filled jobs. Similarly,
aggregate output equals the number of active units of capital, [1−H (µ)]Ke,
times their average productivity.17 Following Houthakker (1955-1956), one
could imagine solving (18) for the aggregate “labor demand” by active firms
µ (Ke, N) and then substituting it in (19) to obtain Y [Ke, µ (Ke, N)]. Here-
after, I use F (Ke, N) to denote Y [Ke, µ (Ke, N)] in order to simplify no-
tation and stress the fact that this is the economy’s “aggregate produc-
tion function”. Even for an arbitrary H, the aggregate production function
is CRS. To see this, notice that µ (Ke, N) is homogeneous of degree zero
and hence (19) indicates that for any ζ > 0, F (ζKe, ζN) = ζF (Ke, N).
Also, from (18) one sees that −µ2 (Ke, N)KedH (µ) = 1 and from (19) that
F2 (Ke, N) = −µ2 (Ke, N)KeµdH (µ). Thus F2 (Ke, N) = µ. So the mar-
17As mentioned previously, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) assume that G has support
[0, 1] and that all new matches start oﬀ with productivity 1. So, with δ = 0, aggregate
output in their model evolves according to
Y˙ = kθq (θ)u− λY + λ (1− u) k
Z 1
µ
xdG (x) .
Replacing (1− u) k with Ke, steady state output is
Y =
θq (θ)uk
λ
+ [1−H (µ)]KeEH (x|x ≥ µ) ,
which is essentially (19) except for the first term. Assuming that the initial productivity of
a new match is a random draw from G —just as the innovations to the productivity of ongo-
ing matches— allows for a density G with unbounded support. In addition, this alternative
assumption smoothes aggregate output by getting rid of the “spike” θq (θ)ukλ−1.
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ginal product of labor in the aggregate production function is equal to the
marginal product of the least eﬃcient unit of labor employed in production.18
Now suppose idiosyncratic shocks are draws from a Pareto distribution
with parameters ε and α, namely
G (x) =
½
0 if x < ε
1− ¡ ε
x
¢α
if ε ≤ x (20)
where ε > 0 and α > 2. 19 Then, provided R ≥ ε, 1 − G (R) = ¡ ε
R
¢α
; and
for any x ≥ R,
G (x)−G (R) =
³ ε
R
´α ·
1−
µ
R
x
¶α¸
.
Substituting these expressions in (3) one sees that the steady state produc-
tivity distribution of active matches is
H (x) =
½
0 if x < R
1− ¡R
x
¢α
if R ≤ x. (21)
This is the cdf of a Pareto distribution with parameters R and α. Using
(21), 1−H (µ) =
³
R
µ
´α
and EH (x|x ≥ µ) = αα−1µ; the aggregates (18) and
(19) specialize to
N =
µ
R
µ
¶α
Ke (22)
Y (Ke, µ) =
α
α− 1R
αµ1−αKe. (23)
Inverting the former to get the aggregate labor demand µ = (Ke/N)
1/αR,
and substituting it in the latter yields
F (Ke, N) = AK
γ
eN
1−γ (24)
18I owe this argument to Erzo G. J. Luttmer.
19This distribution has mean x¯ = αα−1ε and variance equal to
x¯
(α−2)(α−1) . Assuming
α > 2 ensures both are finite.
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where
A =
R
1− γ (25)
and γ ≡ 1/α. This extends the classic aggregation result of Houthakker
(1955-1956).20 The factor A is what macroeconomists normally refer to as
TFP. Its level depends on α, a parameter of the primitive distribution of
productivity shocks, as well as on all the characteristics of the labor market
as summarized by the destruction decision R. Notice that F expresses output
as a function of the aggregate number of hours worked, N , and the total
amount of capital hired by firms with filled jobs, Ke. One can also express
output as a function of the aggregate capital stock, K, simply by substituting
(17) in (24) to get Fˆ (K,N) = AˆKγN1−γ, where Aˆ ≡
h
1−u
1−(1−θ)u
iγ
A.
The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas despite fixed pro-
portions in the micro-level technologies. This results whenever utilization is
imperfectly measured, namely when only a fraction of the capital stock in-
cluded as an argument in the aggregate production function is actually being
used in production.21 Since having firm-worker pairs that sometimes choose
20Houthakker performed the aggregation over production units that employ two variable
factors and face capacity constraints due to a fixed (unmodelled) factor. Here I have
assumed each production unit employs a single variable factor (labor) as well as capital.
Capital is chosen before engaging in search and then remains fixed, hence playing the role of
the fixed factor constraining output at the time employment and production decisions are
made. This formulation delivers an aggregate production function with constant returns
to scale. In contrast, the setup used by Houthakker generates a function of the variable
inputs only and it exhibits diminshing returns to scale. Another relevant diﬀerence is
that the shift parameter in Houthakker’s production function is solely a function of the
parameters in the primitive productivity distribution. But here, decisions can shift the
aggregate production function.
21To see this, notice that if there is no hoarding in equilibrium (i.e. if µ = R) then
N = Ke and F (Ke, N) = AKe. Similarly, if there is hoarding but utilization is perfectly
measured, then aggregate output is again linear in the relevant capital stock. Explicitly, let
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to be inactive aﬀects the shape of the aggregates, I now establish under what
conditions the equilibrium exhibits this property. For the remainder of the
section let τ b = 0 to ease the algebra.
With G given by (20), (15) and (16) specialize to:
R− φ− c− β
1− β cθ +
λ
r + δ + λ
εαR1−α
α− 1 = 0 (26)
εαR1−α
α− 1 −
(r + δ + λ) c
q (θ) (1− β) = 0. (27)
By totally diﬀerentiating,
∂R
∂φ
= (r+δ+λ)η(θ)
βθq(θ)[1−G(R)]+(r+δ+λ)η(θ){1−λ[1−G(R)]r+δ+λ } > 0 (28)
and
∂θ
∂φ
=
− (1− β) θq (θ) [1−G (R)]
(r + δ + λ) η (θ) c
∂R
∂φ
< 0,
where 1−G (R) = (ε/R)α and η (θ) ≡ −θq0 (θ) /q (θ). An increase in φ has no
direct eﬀect on the job-creation condition, and it shifts the job-destruction
condition up in θ-R space. This increases the equilibrium value of R and
decreases the equilibrium value of θ. Combining (26) and (27), one sees that
the sign of φ−R is the sign of λ/q (θ)−[1− (1− θ)β]. So at low productivity
realizations, the firm is more likely to hoard labor than to break the match
when λ is large (and hence the option value of keeping a match is large),
and when q is small (and hence the expected cost of hiring a new worker
is high). Market tightness θ enters the expression with an ambiguous sign
Kp denote the capital stock being used in production, that is Kp = [1−H (µ)]Ke. Then
it follows from (19) that Y = A00Kp, with A00 ≡ EH (x|x ≥ µ). So hoarding, together with
imperfect measurement of utilization cause the aggregate to look Cobb-Douglas in capital
and hours despite fixed proportions in the micro production functions.
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because on the one hand a large θ makes hoarding more likely by increasing
the expected recruiting cost; but on the other, through its eﬀect on the
worker’s reservation wage, it also increases the value of her threat point in
the wage bargain, which makes keeping an unproductive worker employed
more costly and hoarding less likely. In fact, the latter eﬀect disappears if
the worker has no power in the wage bargain (i.e. if β = 0). Next, I provide
a suﬃcient condition for R < φ to be possible in equilibrium under some
parametrizations.
Figure 1: Destruction decision as a function of the variable cost.
Let θ∗ε be defined by q (θ
∗
ε) =
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)c
(1−β)ε and φε =
h
1 + λ
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)
i
ε−³
1 + β
1−βθ
∗
ε
´
c. Then if φ = φε, (26) and (27) are solved by θ (φε) = θ
∗
ε and
R (φε) = ε. Notice that if R (φε) < φε, then there is a nondegenerate interval
[φε,φR) such that R (φ) < φ iﬀ φ ∈ [φε,φR). An example of the function
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R (φ) is illustrated in Figure 1.
So a suﬃcient condition for hoarding to occur in equilibrium (for at least
some range of φ) is that φε − ε > 0, or equivalently, that T (λ, ζ) > 0, where
T (λ, ζ) ≡ λε
(α− 1) (r + δ + λ) −
µ
1 +
β
1− βθ
∗
ε
¶
c.
The parameter ζ summarizes the eﬃciency of matching, with the property
that ∂m (u, v) /∂ζ > 0 and hence that ∂q (θ) /∂ζ > 0 for all θ. Figure 2 plots
the boundary T (λ, ζ) = 0 in λ-ζ space.
Figure 2: Range of parameters for which there is hoarding.
The condition φε−ε > 0 is satisfied for the values of the parameters λ and
ζ that lie below boundary.22 Intuitively, the parameter restriction that makes
22The equilibrium may or may not exhibit hoarding for parametrizations that lie above
the boundary. Note that θ∗ε goes to zero as ζ goes to zero. So T (λ, 0) = 0 iﬀ λ = λ0,
where λ0 ≡ c(α−1)(r+δ)ε−c(a−1) is the point at which the boundary intercepts the horizontal axis
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hoarding possible holds for relatively large λ (i.e. when bad shocks are very
transitory) and relatively low ζ (i.e. when the search process needed to re-
place the worker is very costly). Having characterized the relevant properties
of the equilibrium, the following section studies the eﬀects of labor-market
policies on the level of TFP.
5 Labor-Market Policies and the Level of TFP
This section considers the eﬀects of four policies: employment and hiring
subsidies, firing taxes and unemployment benefits. I follow Pissarides (2000)
and model the subsidies as transfers from the government to the firm and
the firing tax as a payment from the firm to the government.23 The value
function W (x) is still given by (8), while (4), (5) and (7) generalize to
rV = max
k
·
−ck + q (θ)
Z
max [Jo (z) + τhk − V, 0] dG (z)
¸
,
rJ (x) = π (x) + τ ek + λ
Z
max [J (z) , V − τ fk] dG (z)− λJ (x)
−δ [J (x) + τ fk − V ] ,
rU = b+ θq (θ)
Z
max [Wo (z)− U, 0] dG (z) .
in Figure 2. Formally, this boundary is upward-sloping because
∂T
∂ζ
= − βθ
∗
ε
1− β
∂θ∗ε
∂ζ
< 0 and
∂T
∂λ
= ε(r+δ)
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)2 −
bc2(α−1)
(1−β)ε(1−β)q0(θ∗ε) > 0.
23I assume that upon separation the firm must pay the firing tax to the government
because in the present setup, firing taxes would be completely neutral under the alternative
scheme where the firm compensates the fired worker directly. (The eﬀects of such a policy
would be completely undone by the wage bargain.) To keep the analysis simple, the
government’s financing constraints will be ignored. A natural extension would be requiring
the government to run a balanced budget. An example of a scheme which is self-financing
in the steady state is τf = τh and τ b = τe = 0.
22
The policy variables are τh (hiring subsidy), τ e (employment subsidy), τ f (fir-
ing tax) and b (unemployment benefit). Note that all payments are assumed
to be proportional to the firm’s size, as measured by k.24 There are two rea-
sons why the bargaining situation faced by a firm and worker when they first
meet and are still considering whether to form a match is diﬀerent from the
one they face every instant after having agreed to form a match. The first
is that in the initial bargain there is a one-time hiring subsidy at stake. The
second, is that at that point the firm is not yet “locked in” by the firing tax. I
use wo (x) to denote the wage that solves the initial bargain and w (x) to de-
note the subsequent one. SoWo (x)−W (x) = J (x)−Jo (x) = wo (x)−w (x),
and hence
Jo (x) +Wo (x) = J (x) +W (x) . (29)
The wages wo (x) and w (x) are respectively characterized by
β [Jo (x) + τhk] = (1− β) [Wo (x)− U ]
β [J (x) + τ fk] = (1− β) [W (x)− U ] .
Letting So (x) = Jo (x) + Wo (x) + τhk − U and S (x) = J (x) + W (x) +
τ fk − U be the initial and the subsequent surplus respectively, the first-
order conditions imply that Wo (x) − U = βSo (x), W (x) − U = βS (x),
Jo (x) + τhk = (1− β)So (x) and J (x) + τ fk = (1− β)S (x). Combining
these with the value functions gives
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = (x− φ− c) k+τ ek+rτ fk−rU+λ
Z
max [S (z) , 0] dG (z) ,
24This assumption is useful because it ensures that the policies introduce no scale eﬀects
into the job-creation and destruction decisions.
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with rU as in (10). Since S0 (x) > 0, there is a unique R such that S (x) ≥ 0
iﬀ x ≥ R. Using this reservation property, the surplus of an ongoing match
can be written as
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = (x− φ− c) k+τ ek+rτ fk−rU+λ
Z
R
S (z) dG (z) , (30)
a natural generalization of (11). One can work with the value functions and
the first order conditions of the Nash problem to derive expressions for wages
and profit. The key observations are that wo (x) is decreasing in the firing
tax but increasing in the hiring and employment subsidies, while w (x) is
increasing in the employment subsidy and the firing tax and independent of
the hiring subsidy.25 Evaluating (30) at x = R,
λ
Z
R
S (z) dG (z) = rU − [(R− φ− c) k + τ ek + rτ fk] ,
and substituting this back into (30) yields (14). Using (14) to substitute S (z)
out of (30), evaluating at x = R and using (10) produces the job-destruction
condition that generalizes (15):
R− φ− c+ τ e + rτ f −
µ
τ b +
β
1− β cθ
¶
+
λ
r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) = 0.
25The wages and profit agreed upon in an ongoing match are:
w (x) = β [(x− φ− c) k + τek + rτfk] + (1− β) rU
π (x) = (1− β) [(x− φ− c) k − rU ]− β [τek + rτfk] ,
while those in an initial match are:
wo (x) = β [(x− φ− c) k + τek + (r + δ + λ) τhk − (δ + λ) τfk] + (1− β) rU
πo (x) = (1− β) [(x− φ− c) k − rU ]− β [τek + (r + δ + λ) τhk − (δ + λ) τfk] .
24
For simplicity, I have specified b = τ bk where τ b ∈ [0, 1) is akin to a replace-
ment rate.26 Increases in the employment subsidy and the firing tax reduce R
for given θ. In other words, an increase in τ e or τ f shifts the job-destruction
condition down in θ-R space. Conversely, an increase in τ b raises the worker’s
outside option and hence increases R for given θ.
By free entry, rV = 0, and
(1− β)
Z
R
So (x) dG (x) =
ck
q (θ)
. (31)
Finally, using (29), So (x) = S (x) + (τh − τ f) k, which combined with (14)
can be used to substitute So (x) from (31) to obtain the job-creation condi-
tion:
1
r + δ + λ
Z
R
(x−R) dG (x) + [1−G (R)] (τh − τ f) = c
(1− β) q (θ) .
For given R, the hiring subsidy increases and the firing tax decreases job-
creation. The other policy instruments have no direct eﬀect on the entry
decision. Finally, assuming G is as in (20), the job-destruction and creation
conditions specialize to:
R− φ− c+ τ e + rτ f −
³
τ b +
β
1−β cθ
´
+ λε
αR1−α
(α−1)(r+δ+λ) = 0 (32)
εαR1−α
(α−1)(r+δ+λ) +
³ ε
R
´α
(τh − τ f)− cq(θ)(1−β) = 0. (33)
The main properties of the equilibrium are summarized in the following
proposition.
26This formulation of the unemployment compensation is a clean way to ensure the
job-destruction equation is independent k. Another —perhaps more realistic— way to
obtain the same result would be to adopt the specification outlined before, where
b = τ bEx [w (x) |x ≥ R]. The formulation in the text yields the same qualitative results,
but it is simpler because b remains independent of R.
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Proposition 1. Let θ∗² be defined by
q (θ∗²) =
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)c
(1−β)[ε+(α−1)(r+δ+λ)(τh−τf)]
, and let
φ² =
h
1 + λ
(α−1)(r+δ+λ)
i
ε−
³
1 + β
1−βθ
∗
²
´
c+ τh + rτ f − τ b > 0.
If ε+ (α− 1) (r + δ + λ) (τh − τ f) > 0, then for any φ > φ²: (a) there exists
a unique equilibrium; (b) R > ε; (c) ∂R/∂φ > 0 and (d) ∂θ/∂φ < 0. If in
addition, φ² − ε > 0, then: (e) there is a nondegenerate interval (φ², eφ) such
that R (φ) < φ for all φ ∈ (φ², eφ).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Aggregate output is still given by (24); the aggregate stock of capital
demanded by filled jobs, Ke, is still given by (17); and the aggregate number
of hours worked, N , is still as in (22). In addition, if the measure of capital
used to construct aggregate output is Ke, then the level of TFP is still given
by (25). The following proposition, which holds under the assumptions stated
in Proposition 1, summarizes the eﬀects that labor market policies have on
A, the level of TFP.
Proposition 2. Employment subsidies and firing restrictions reduce A.
Hiring subsidies and unemployment benefits increase A.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since A is proportional to R, policy instruments have the same qualitative
eﬀect on TFP as on the destruction rate. Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure
3.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium eﬀects of various policies.
Employment subsidies make firms more tolerant of low productivity re-
alizations, and hence lower the average productivity of active firms. All else
equal, an economy with relatively high subsidies to continued employment
will exhibit a low job-destruction rate, a high job-creation rate, and hence
low levels of unemployment and measured TFP. Firing taxes have a similar
qualitative eﬀect on job-destruction, but that mechanism is reinforced by a
relatively low rate of job-creation (which reduces the reservation wage and
hence makes firms even more tolerant of low productivity realizations). So
firing restrictions will reduce measured TFP, as well as the job-creation and
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destruction rates. Hiring subsidies have no direct eﬀect on the destruction
decision, but they stimulate job-creation. This increases market tightness
which in turn increases the workers’ outside option and raises measured
TFP, job-creation and destruction. Unemployment benefits also cause R
to rise through an increase in the worker’s reservation wage. Consequently,
economies with relatively high unemployment benefits will tend to exhibit
relatively high levels of TFP and unemployment.
6 Extensions
This section extends the basic model to the case of serially-correlated shocks,
provides a generalization of the main aggregation result, and shows how the
observed level of TFP is aﬀected by the diﬀerent ways of measuring aggregate
inputs that can be found in the literature.
6.1 Correlated Shocks
The maintenance cost C (x,φ) was introduced in Section 2 as a simple device
to avoid “flat spots” in the value functions.27 Here I show that by extending
the model in a natural way, one can drop the maintenance cost without af-
fecting the main results. To this end, I generalize the productivity process by
allowing for serially correlated shocks: when match of productivity x suﬀers
a change, the new value x0 is a draw from the fixed distribution G (x0|x).
27If π (x) = [max (x− φ, 0)− c] k − w (x), then π (x) is flat up to φ and then rises with
slope k. It is easy to show that in this case J (x) is also flat up to φ and then rises with
slope kr+δ+λ . Note that since R is defined by J (R) = 0, this implies that generically the
equilibrium will have φ < R (except for the knife-edge case in which R is indeterminate).
Ruling out this type of flat spots in J allows for the possibility that R < φ in equilibrium.
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Assuming G (x|x1) < G (x|x0) if x0 < x1, allows idiosyncratic shocks to be
positively correlated through time. For this case, the cross-section of pro-
ductivities evolves according to
d
dt
[(1− ut)Ht (x)] = λ (1− ut)
Z ∞
x
[G (x|s)−G (Rt|s)] dHt (s)
+θq (θ)ut
Z ∞
−∞
[G (x|s)−G (Rt|s)] dHt (s)
−λ (1− ut)
Z x
−∞
G (Rt|s) dHt (s)
−
Z x
−∞
[1−G (x|s)] dHt (s)
−δ (1− ut)Ht (x)λ (1− ut) .
The first term accounts for the matches with productivities above x that get
innovations below x but above Rt. The newly-formed matches that start
oﬀ with productivities no larger than x are in the second term. Notice the
assumption that upon contact, the worker and firm draw their productivity
level from the density corresponding to the average productivity among active
matches.28 The third term is the number of matches in the interval [Rt, x]
that get shocks below Rt and are destroyed. The fourth term accounts for the
number of matches in the same interval that “move up” by virtue of having
drawn productivities larger than x. The last term accounts for matches in
28When shocks were iid, I could just specify that new matches drew z from G (z) just
as active matches did when forced to update their shock. However, with correlated shocks
active matches with state z draw the new shock z0 from G (z0|z). Since vacancies and
unemployed workers have no productivity attached to them, I assume their initial draw
z0 is from the average density
R
G (z0|z) dH (z). As a way of motivating this, imagine —as
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) do— that firms must irreversibly adopt a “technology” to
engage in production. The present specification then means that they pick their technology
at random from all those active at the time the match is created.
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the interval [Rt, x] that are destroyed for exogenous reasons. Imposing steady
states and re-arranging:
H (x) =
·
λ
δ + λ
+
θq (θ) u
(δ + λ) (1− u)
¸ Z
[G (x|s)−G (R|s)] dH (s) .
The steady-state unemployment rate is
u =
δ + λ
R
G (R|s) dH (s)
δ + λ
R
G (R|s) dH (s) + θq (θ) R [1−G (R|s)] dH (s) . (34)
Using this expression, the steady-state cross-sectional productivity distribu-
tion can be rewritten as
H (x) =
R
[G (x|s)−G (R|s)] dH (s)R
[1−G (R|s)] dH (s) , (35)
a natural generalization of (3).
The firm’s problem upon entering the market is now summarized by
rV = max
k
·
−ck + q (θ)
Z Z
max [J (z)− V, 0] dG (z|x) dH (x)
¸
. (36)
Again, there is entry of firms until all rents are exhausted, so rV = 0 in
equilibrium. The value of a filled job with productivity x is
rJ (x) = π (x)+λ
Z
max [J (z) , V ] dG (z|x)−λJ (x)− δ [J (x)− V ] , (37)
where π (x) = maxn [xmin (n, k)− φn− ck − w (x)]. Flow profit π (x) is the
residual remaining after the wage w (x) and all other costs of production
have been paid out. There are only two such costs in this formulation: the
fixed cost, ck, and the variable one, φn. The wage w is independent of
n, so the profit-maximizing choice of hours is still given by (6), and hence
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π (x) = y (x) − w (x), where y (x) ≡ [max (x− φ, 0)− c] k is output net of
the variable cost and the rental on capital.
The values of unemployment and employment to a worker are:
rU = b+ θq (θ)
Z Z
max [W (z)− U, 0] dG (z|x) dH (x) (38)
rW (x) = w (x) + λ
Z
max [W (z)− U, 0] dG (z|x) (39)
− (δ + λ) [W (x)− U ] ,
where w (x) it is still characterized by (9). Letting S (x) = J (x) +W (x)−
U denote the surplus from a match, notice that (9) implies that J (x) =
(1− β)S (x) and W (x) − U = βS (x). These together with (37), (38) and
(39) imply
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = y (x)− rU + λ
Z
max [S (z) , 0] dG (z|x) ,
where rU is given by (10). The fact that S0 (x) > 0 implies that there exists
a unique R such that S (R) > 0 iﬀ x > R. Hence matches separate whenever
productivity falls below R. For completeness, (9) and the value functions can
be manipulated to obtain expressions for instantaneous wages and profit:
w (x) = βy (x) + (1− β) rU (40)
π (x) = (1− β) [y (x)− rU ] . (41)
It turns out that one can get a much sharper characterization of the
equilibrium by putting some structure on the conditional distributionG (s|x).
In what follows, I assume that dG (s|x) = ξ (x) gˆ (s) where ξ0 (x) > 0.29 The
29The Pareto distribution considered below is an example of a density that satisfies this
condition.
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surplus from a match x is now
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = y (x)− rU + λξ (x)
Z
R
S (z) gˆ (z) dz, (42)
and evaluating it at x = R yields
λ
Z
R
S (z) gˆ (z) dz =
rU − y (R)
ξ (R)
.
Since the expected capital gain on the left-hand-side is positive, at x = R
net output is smaller than the worker’s reservation wage. From (40) and (41)
one again verifies that w (R) < rU and π (R) < 0. Substituting the simpler
expression for the expected capital gain term into (42) yields30
(r + δ + λ)S (x) = y (x)− rU + ξ (x)
ξ (R)
[rU − y (R)] . (43)
Note that y0 (x) ≥ 0, and that the expected capital gain from the next draw
(the second term) is increasing in current productivity because ξ0 (x) > 0 (i.e.
a higher shock today means the next innovation will be drawn from a better
distribution). Thus S0 (x) = y0 (x) + [ξ0 (x) /ξ (R)] [rU − y (R)] > 0. Just as
30A word of caution is in order here. In general, the lower bound of the support of
the density ξ (x) gˆ (s) could itself be a function of x. For instance, assume the sup-
port is [ε (x) ,∞). Then, formally, the capital gain term in (42) should be written as
λξ (x)
R
max[R,ε(x)]
S (z) gˆ (z) dz, and then evaluating the surplus at x = R would yield
λ
Z
max[R,ε(R)]
S (z) gˆ (z) dz =
rU − y (R)
ξ (R)
.
Thus
λ
Z
max[R,ε(x)]
S (z) gˆ (z) dz =
rU − y (R)
ξ (R)
and (43) follows iﬀ R > ε (x) for all x. A restriction that one can assume —and must later
verify— to be satisfied in equilibrium.
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before, the equilibrium can have φ < R or R < φ. Evaluating (42) at x = R
and using (43) to substitute S (z) yields the job-destruction condition:
y (R)− rU + λ
r + δ + λ
Z
R
½
y (z)− rU + ξ (z)
ξ (R)
[rU − y (R)]
¾
dG (z|R) = 0.
Equation (36) and rV = 0 imply that at the optimal k,
(1− β)
Z Z
R
S (z) dG (z|x) dH (x) = ck
q (θ)
,
namely the expected profit from a filled job equals the expected recruiting
cost. Using (43) to substitute S (z) out of this expression yields the job-
creation condition:Z Z
R
½
y (z)− rU + ξ (z)
ξ (R)
[rU − y (R)]
¾
dG (z|x) dH (x) = (r + δ + λ) ck
(1− β) q (θ) .
After some manipulations, the job-destruction and creation conditions
respectively simplify to:
−[rU−y(R)]
k
+ λ
r+δ+λ
½
ϕ (µ|R) + rU−y(R)
ξ(R)k
Z
R
[ξ (x)− ξ (R)] dG (x|R)
¾
= 0
Z
ϕ (µ|z) dH (z) + rU−y(R)
ξ(R)k
Z Z
R
[ξ (x)− ξ (R)] dG (x|z) dH (z) = (r+δ+λ)c
(1−β)q(θ) ,
where ϕ (µ|R) ≡ R
µ
[1−G (x|R)] dx and µ ≡ max (φ, R). Given the cross-
sectional productivity distribution H, the job-creation and destruction con-
ditions jointly determine R and θ. Observe that these conditions are anal-
ogous to those in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) when φ = 0 and ξ (x) =
ξ for all x. More formally, for given c and φ, an equilibrium is a list
[R, θ, H, U,w, u, k] such that R, θ and H jointly solve (35) and the job-
creation and the job-destruction conditions; rU is given by (10); w by (40);
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and u satisfies (34). In addition, the market for capital should clear, so k
must satisfy [1− (1− θ) u] k = K.
Now suppose idiosyncratic shocks are draws from
G (x|s) =
(
0 if x < ε (s)
1−
h
ε(s)
x
iα
if ε (s) ≤ x
where ε (·) is a continuously diﬀerentiable function and α > 2. I introduce
positively correlated shocks by assuming that ε0 > 0. (The special case of iid
shocks corresponds to ε0 = 0.) In addition, suppose there is an ε > 0 such
that ε (ε) = ε and ε (s) = 0 if s < ε, and that lim
s→∞
ε (s) = 1 + ε ≡ ε.31
Then for R ≥ ε (s), 1−G (R|s) =
h
ε(s)
R
iα
; and hence for any x ≥ R,
G (x|s)−G (R|s) =
·
ε (s)
R
¸α ·
1−
µ
R
x
¶α¸
.
After substituting these expressions in (35) it becomes clear that the steady
state productivity cross-section is still given by (21). So for this case, the
job-creation and destruction conditions, respectively, specialize to
µ1−αRα
α−1 − α[y(R)−rU ]k
h
R
ε(R)
iα Z
R
ε(x)α−ε(R)α
x1+α
dx = (r+δ+λ)c
(1−β)q(θ)
·
α
Z
R
ε(x)α
x1+α
dx
¸−1
·
1− λα
r+δ+λ
Z
R
ε(x)α−ε(R)α
x1+α
dx
¸
y(R)−rU
k
+ λ
r+δ+λ
ε(R)αµ1−α
α−1 = 0.
Under relatively mild conditions, it can be shown that the job-creation con-
dition slopes down and the destruction condition up in θ-R space, implying
a unique (θ, R) pair. A parameter restriction analogous to the one depicted
in Figure 2 guaranteeing that there is a range of values for φ such that
31An example of an ε (·) satisfying all these conditions is ε (s) = 1 + ε − eε−s, for any
ε > 0.
34
R < φ can still be derived.32 Following the procedure used in Section 4, it is
straightforward to verify that output still aggregates to (24).
6.2 More on Aggregation
Section 4 established that when the idiosyncratic shocks are drawn from a
Pareto distribution, aggregate output always looks like a Cobb-Douglas func-
tion of the aggregate labor and capital inputs. This subsection generalizes
the previous result by characterizing the distribution of shocks that gives rise
to an aggregate CES production function.
Suppose the primitive distribution of shocks, G, is given by
G (x) =
(
0 if x < ε
1−
h
1
σ
¡
x
ε
¢ ρ
1−ρ − 1−σ
σ
i−1/ρ
if ε ≤ x (44)
with ε > 0 and ρ,σ ∈ (0, 1).33 Substituting (44) into (3) one sees that for
any R ≥ ε, the steady state productivity distribution of active matches is
H (x) = 1− κ
·
1
σ
³x
ε
´ ρ
1−ρ − 1− σ
σ
¸−1/ρ
(45)
if R ≤ x; and H (x) = 0 if x < R, with κ ≡ [1−G (R)]−1. Using the method
proposed by Levhari (1968), one can show the following result.
32In addition, one should always make sure that the equilibrium satisfies R > ε. Recall
that the derivation of (43) implicitly assumes that R > ε (s) for all s. This condition is
satisfied if R > ε. Showing that equilibria with R < φ are possible for some parametriza-
tions is now rather tedious, so the basic idea is only outlined here. Let φε be the value
of φ such that θ∗ε and R (φε) = ε solve the job-creation and destruction conditions. Then
if φε − ε > 0, there will be an interval (φε, bφ) such that R (φ) < φ iﬀ φ ∈ (φε, bφ). If,
in addition, ∂R (φ) /∂φ > 0, then φε − ε > 0 also implies ε < R (φ) for all φ ∈ (φε, bφ).
Finally, notice that R > ε also implies that every match faces a positive probability of
being destroyed for endogenous reasons. To see why, suppose R = $ < ε; then any match
that reaches a state s > ε−1 ($) will never be destroyed endogenously.
33Under these conditions G0 (x) ≥ 0 and lim
x→∞G (x) = 1, so G is a proper cdf . Hereafter
we return to the case with iid shocks.
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Proposition 3. If the primitive distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks
is given by (44), then in equilibrium, the aggregates Y , Ke and N satisfy
Y = B
£
σA¯Kρe + (1− σ)Nρ
¤1/ρ
, with B = ε
1−σ , and A¯ =
h
1
σ
¡
R
ε
¢ ρ
1−ρ − 1−σ
σ
i
.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In this case, all the characteristics of the labor market as summarized by
R aﬀect the measured productivity of inputs asymmetrically.34 Notice that
as ρ→ 0, (44) approaches the Pareto distribution in (20) with parameters ε
and α = 1/σ. So in this sense, the CES aggregate in Proposition 3 approaches
the Cobb-Douglas aggregate in (24) as the elasticity of substitution 1/ (1− ρ)
approaches unity.35
6.3 Measurement
I conclude this section by showing how the observed level of TFP is aﬀected
by the diﬀerent ways of measuring aggregate inputs that can be found in
the literature. The measure of capital input used by Hall and Jones (1999)
did not adjust for utilization. This means that K instead of Ke was used
in the production function, which would imply Fˆ (K,N) = AˆKγN1−γ, with
Aˆ =
h
1−u
1−(1−θ)u
iγ
A, as mentioned in Section 4. But in addition, Hall and Jones
34If the aggregation were performed using (44) instead of its truncation, then the ag-
gregate would instead be Y = R1−σ [σK
ρ
e + (1− σ)Nρ]1/ρ. However, there is no primitive
density that has (44) as its truncation.
35Notice, however, that the truncation of (44) does not approach (21) as ρ→ 0. That is,
even though the primitive distribution approaches a Pareto, its truncation does not limit
a truncated Pareto. This is because the density in (44) is not “closed” under truncations
(as for example the Pareto and the exponential distributions are). This “discontinuity”
introduced by the truncation is the reason why if we take the limit on the truncated cdf
or on the CES aggregate directly, we don’t obtain exactly (24).
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(1999) report they did not have data on hours per worker for all countries in
their sample, so they used the number of employed workers instead of hours
worked as a measure labor input. Letting E = 1−u denote employment and
using (17) and (22), the number of hours worked is N = (R/µ)1/γ KE
1−(1−θ)u , so
their measurements of inputs imply that the aggregate relationship between
inputs, output and TFP that they observed was F˜ (K,E) = A˜KγE1−γ, with
A˜ =
h
(R/µ)1/γK
1−(1−θ)u
i1−γ
Aˆ.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper presented a theory of aggregate TFP diﬀerences based on the
interaction between institutions and the microeconomics underlying the ag-
gregate production function. It focused on a precise type of institutions,
namely labor-market policies as measured by the magnitudes of hiring and
employment subsidies, unemployment benefits and firing taxes. In the model,
firm-level technologies are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that induce a cross-
sectional distribution of productivities. Labor-market policies aﬀect the pro-
ductivity composition of active firms through their eﬀects on the job-creation
and destruction decisions.
Policies that make firing diﬃcult make firms less willing to give up rel-
atively unproductive opportunities to search for better ones, lowering the
average productivity among active matches, and aggregate TFP. Employ-
ment subsidies also make firms more tolerant of low productivity realizations
and hence they also decrease TFP. Unemployment benefits have the opposite
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eﬀect. Hiring subsidies stimulate job creation and cause more competition
among firms. As a result, firms become more selective and only pursue very
productive ventures. The cross-sectional distribution of productivities shifts
to the right, and aggregate TFP rises.
The model could serve as a guide to understand aggregate productivity
data. It could be parametrized to find out how large the diﬀerences in the
mix and magnitude of labor-market policies have to be in order to explain the
diﬀerences in TFP levels among a relevant set of countries. It may also prove
to be a useful tool for the econometrician interested in measuring aggregate
productivity.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let θ (φ), and R (φ) denote the solution to (32) and (33) when it exists;
and define τ (R) = R + α (r + δ + λ) (τh − τ f). By totally diﬀerentiating
(32) and (33):
∂R (φ)
∂φ
=
(r + δ + λ) η (θ)
[βθq (θ) /R] (ε/R)α τ (R) + (r + δ + λ) η (θ)
h
1− λ(ε/R)α
r+δ+λ
i
∂θ (φ)
∂φ
=
− (1− β) θq (θ) (1/R) (ε/R)α τ (R)
(r + δ + λ) η (θ) c
∂R
∂φ
.
So τ (R) > 0 is suﬃcient for ∂R/∂φ > 0. If φ = φ², then (32) and (33) have
a unique solution, namely θ (φ²) = θ
∗
² and R (φ²) = ε. But τ (ε) > 0 by
assumption, so ∂R (φ²) /∂φ > 0. This and the continuity of R (φ) implies
that R (φ) > ε for all φ > φ². Since τ
0 > 0, for any φ > φ², then τ (R) > 0
and therefore ∂R (φ) /∂φ > 0 and ∂θ (φ) /∂φ < 0. This establishes parts
(b), (c) and (d). In θ-R space, the slopes of the job-destruction and creation
conditions are
βc
1− β
h
1− λ(ε/R)α
r+δ+λ
i > 0, and −cη (θ) (r + δ + λ)R
(1− β) θq (θ) (ε/R)α τ (R) < 0
respectively, which establishes (a). Finally, φ² − ε > 0 is equivalent to φ² −
R (φ²) > 0, which implies (e).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Define
∆ =
(ε/R)α τ (R)
(r + δ + λ)R
+
η (θ)
βθq (θ)
·
1− λ (ε/R)
α
r + δ + λ
¸
.
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Since τ (R) > 0 by Proposition 1, it follows that ∆ > 0 in any equilibrium.
By totally diﬀerentiating (32) and (33),
∂R
∂τ e
=
−η (θ)
βθq (θ)∆
< 0,
∂R
∂τ f
= − (1/∆)
·
(ε/R)α +
rη (θ)
βθq (θ)
¸
< 0,
∂R
∂τh
= (1/∆) (ε/R)α > 0,
∂R
∂τ b
= − ∂R
∂τ e
> 0,
and this concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.
The problem is to find a cdf H that satisfies H (R) = 0 and yields
Y = a [σ1 (κˆKe)
ρ + σ2N
ρ]
1/ρ
, (46)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and a, κˆ, σ1 and σ2 are positive constants. Define ς (x) =R
x
zh (z) dz and s (x) = 1 − H (x). Since, in general, Y = ς (µ)Ke and
N = s (µ)Ke, (46) can be rewritten as ς (x)
ρ = aρ [σ1κˆ
ρ + σ2s (x)
ρ]. Diﬀer-
entiating both sides of this expression gives ς (x) =
³
x
σ2aρ
´ 1
1−ρ
s (x). The last
two equations yield s (x) = κˆ
·
1
σ1
³
x
σ2a
´ ρ
1−ρ − σ2
σ1
¸−1/ρ
, which by defining
ε = σ2a (σ1 + σ2)
1−ρ
ρ and σ =
σ1
σ1 + σ2
(47)
can be rewritten as H (x) = 1 − κˆ
h
1
σ
¡
x
ε
¢ ρ
1−ρ − 1−σ
σ
i−1/ρ
. The requirement
that H (R) = 0 implies that κˆ = κ (with κ as defined in Subsection 6.2).
After specifying that H (x) = 0 for x < R, this expression is identical to
(45). So by construction, aggregation under (45) yields (46). And after
letting κˆ = κ and making the substitutions in (47), one realizes that (46) is
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identical to the aggregate in the statement Proposition 3. Finally, verifying
that (45) is the truncation of (44) at R concludes the proof.
To complete the analysis of Section 5, here I report the eﬀects of all
policies on market tightness.
∂θ
∂τ e
=
− (1− β) θq (θ) (ε/R)α τ (R)
cη (θ) (r + δ + λ)R
∂R
∂τ e
> 0,
∂θ
∂τh
=
1− β
βc
·
1− λ (ε/R)
α
r + δ + λ
¸
∂R
∂τh
> 0,
∂θ
∂τ b
=
− (1− β) θq (θ) (ε/R)α τ (R)
cη (θ) (r + δ + λ)R
∂R
∂τ b
< 0,
∂θ
∂τ f
=
1− β
βc
½
r +
·
1− λ (ε/R)
α
r + δ + λ
¸
∂R
∂τ f
¾
.
Without additional restrictions the sign of ∂θ/∂τ f is ambiguous. It is
negative in any equilibrium with φ > φ² if δ > r (1− ε) /ε.
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